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Others in the Making of Selves
Roberta L. Coles
Sociology Department, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

The Self has received renewed attention across disciplines in recent
years. Scholars have analyzed, psychoanalyzed, discovered, named,
and narrated a plethora of selves. There are dialogic selves (Bakhtin
1981; Fand 1999), playing selves (Melucci 1996), redemptive selves
(McAdams 2006), emotionally managed selves (Hochschild 1983),
muscled selves (Sparkes et al. 2005), mediated selves (Sawrey 2005),
saturated selves (Gergen 1991), extended selves (Eakin 2004), night
and day selves (Fand 1999), embodied selves (Sacks 1985), ad
infinitum. [For a good overview of more Selves than you can shake a
stick at, see Holstein & Gubrium (2000).]
Even within a single individual a multiplicity of subjectivities can
and, it is frequently advocated, should co-exist. A complex society
exists within the individual. Hence, any sense of privacy we cling to
can only be a figment of false consciousness; with multiple selves, we
are never alone. Enjoying one’s own company is akin to standing in
the middle of Grand Central Station. An apparent monologue is no less
than a colloquium. Even the most private self-masturbatory act
becomes an orgy.
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In this rush to propagate and pander to Selves, the Other has
been overlooked. As frequently occurs, those at the forefront of fame
and fortune neglect to acknowledge those along the way who helped
them become who they are today. Ironically so, because it is difficult,
if not impossible, for a Self to exist without an Other.1 As sociologist
Peter Berger asserts (1963:98-9), “identity is socially bestowed,
socially sustained, and socially transformed….taking the role of the
other is decisive for the formation of the self.” One way or another,
“the Other” plays a major role in how the self is formulated, enlivened,
and embodied in life and in academic discourse.
This paper traverses the diverse roles assigned to the Other in
various academic treatises on the Self. I do not offer a typology or
exhaustive catalog of roles that the Other might play, but rather I
show how the Other has been variously construed by unpacking the
roles and responsibilities assigned to the Other in some influential
texts of various disciplines and current research on the Self or Other
over the past few decades. Neither do I attempt to advocate for a
particular formulation of the Other, nor promote a specific version of
the Other as especially useful or empirically viable. I am more
interested in exploring the power and agency of the Other, and in
discussing how the various dimensions and functions of the Other are
consequential for interesting, important narratives about the social
self. I suggest questions to guide future explorations into the abyss of
the Other.

An Assortment of Others
Unfortunately, I am not the first to attempt to map out the
narrative terrain of Others. In 1985 R. S. Perinbanayagam presented
various social theorists’ conceptions of the Other in his book Signifying
Acts: Structure and Meaning in Everyday Life. Basically, they comprise
three Others: the Generalized Other, the Meiotic Other (my language),
and the Significant Other. I will address three additional Others—the
Unconscious Other, the Marginalized Other, and the Nonhuman Other-that I find in a broader and more recent literature. Although I group
them into six main Others, the borders of these types are somewhat
arbitrary, porous, and nondiscrete, as interaction and intersection exist
among them. Two characteristics that distinguish one Other from
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another are whether the Other exists within or outside the Self and
whether the Other is an individual or aggregate entity. The
Unconscious Other and the Generalized Other both are constructed
from symbolic material outside the individual but ultimately take up
residence within the Self. The Meiotic Self is the self divided; there
may be multiple divisions but each Meiotic Self is usually presented as
singly constituted. The Significant Other, an individual, and the
Marginalized Other, often a status group or member of it, reside
outside the Self but play supporting roles in relation to any particular
Self, which may also be an individual or status group, such as men,
Whites, and Americans. The Nonhuman Other may be individual, an
aggregate of individuals or the product of human behavior, all of which
reside outside the Self.

The Unconscious Other.
The Unconscious Other derives from psychoanalytic literature,
particularly that of Jacques Lacan, who regrettably disguised his
meaning of the “Other” in the verbal garments of at least five different
conceptual costumes, the Unconscious being the main or
encompassing one (Lemaire 1977; Socor 1997). Even devoted
disciples of Lacan appear uncertain of the Other’s identity. Catherine
Clement (1983), a student of Lacan’s, argues that the Other is the
embodiment of the Unconscious, the Phallic Law, the Father, and
functions as the repository of language and culture; she argues that
these are all found in the same “location” within the Self. On the other
hand, psychoanalytical scholar Wendy Hollway (1993) posits that the
Lacanian Other is the Mother.
In much psychoanalytic thought, the development of the Self
and its Unconscious is correlated with the inauguration of the psychic
drives of Desire, Lack, and Absence. These motivating states are
precipitated by the bodily, and later the emotional, separation from
the Mother, which create a lifelong unsatisfied Desire for reunion.
Specifically, one of Lacan’s multiple Others is the signifier of the
Mother, or more precisely, the signifier of unlimited enjoyment of and
union with the mother’s body, known as “jouissance” in Lacan’s
theory. Lacan placed a slash or bar through his symbol for MotherOther to indicate the prohibition of unlimited access to and enjoyment
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of the mother (Glowinski et al. 2001). In both Freud and Lacan, the
source of prohibition is the father, and fear of his jealous wrath results
in the infamous castration complex.
Freud argues that without the castration complex one cannot
fully experience sexual desire, as it is only the prohibition of the
incestual object (mom) that forces one to seek enjoyment in a
nonincestual object. It is this Lack of the primordial Mother that
inaugurates Desire and drives the subject to search elsewhere for what
it lacks (Glowinski et al 2001). From then on, according to Lacan, all
human desire is the desire of the Other (Lacan 1977[1959]: 58); that
is, the first object of desire is to be recognized--needed, loved,
admired, valued, acknowledged--by the Other (Bracher 1995).
While Freud first posited the Unconscious as a repository of the
images, sounds and emotions available to and repressed by the child
during the first six months or so of its life, Lacan introduced language
as a central factor in the formation of the Unconscious (Peters 1993).
The child moves from an imaginary to a symbolic register with the
acquisition of language through interaction with Others.
The role of language in the formation of the Unconscious is not
unrelated to the initiation of Desire through the castration complex
just described. Lacan’s addition of language and symbolization
presupposes that all systems of representation are based on Absence,
echoing the primal loss of the mother (Siegal 1999). Humans must use
words, signifiers, to communicate. By definition, the signifier is never
the signified thing itself, so there results an incongruence, a
dissatisfying lack or absence of the thing itself. Language, like the
prohibitive castration complex, separates the subject from the full
enjoyment of union with the primordial Other. Language, then,
becomes a fence, a moat, between the Conscious and the
Unconscious.
It is this constant yearning for what is not there, this enduring
sense of incompleteness and separation that, according to Socor
(1997: 184), stimulates awareness of the Self. Desire, “the
experiential affirmation of absence,” gives birth to the I, and one may
imagine…that the first utterance of I is more closely characterized as ‘I
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desire’.” In this psychoanalytical shell game, Lacan’s “I desire;
therefore, I am” replaces the Cartesian “I think; therefore, I am.”
The Unconscious becomes the repository for forbidden desires
and signifiers, which become inaccessible to the volitional Self. In a
sense then, the Self represents what is there and the Unconscious
represents what is not there, what is absent, what is lacking. Socor
(1997:7) suggests that the Unconscious Other is the “absent made
present;” “[T]he Other speaks this absence which (unconsciously)
controls us….The Other is the absent guest at the table of
consciousness.” Therefore, one of Lacan’s famous dicta is that the
“unconscious is the discourse of the Other.”

The Generalized Other
The Generalized Other is the sociological counterpart to
psychology’s Unconscious Other. Analogous to Freud’s superego in his
Holy Trinity of the id, ego and superego, social psychologist G.H.
Mead’s ([1934] 1964) concept of the Generalized Other is the
repository of societal norms. According to Perinbanayagam (1985)
interpretation, the Generalized Other is the social-psychological form
of the abstraction that sociologists and anthropologists call ‘social
structure.’ Like Lacan’s Unconscious Other, the Generalized Other is
formed through social interaction and therefore reflects historical and
cultural maleability; it is not inherent within the individual. “The
organized community or social group which gives to the individual his
unity of self may be called ‘the generalized other.’ The attitude of the
generalized other is the attitude of the whole community” (1964:
218).
Mead uses the concept of a game to illustrate. In a game, the
individual must understand and enact the roles of all others involved in
the game and comprehend the rules that condition the various roles
(Mead [1934] 1964). These roles-organized-by-rules coalesce into a
symbolic unity, the Generalized Other, mirroring the values and
attitudes of a particular society, which becomes internalized into what
Mead refers to as the “Me” (as opposed to the “I”) part of the Self.
Thus, the Generalized Other embeds society within the individual Self,
acting as a normative template, guide, and constraint on the Self.
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Unlike the singular Unconscious Other, an individual may have
multiple Generalized Others because the individual can hold
membership in multiple “societies,” such as an organization, a status
group, family, tribe or nation, each having its own attitudes, values
and expected behaviors. These Generalized Others may conflict with
one another, and the Self must negotiate among them.

The Significant Other.
This is perhaps the simplest and most straightforward Other of
those proffered here, and it is most frequently addressed in the
literature on “relational Selves” or “dialogic Selves.” There can be as
many Significant Others as, but not more than, there are embodied
individuals. The Significant Other is, for lack of a better term, a “real”
person, possibly a family member, partner, friend, therapist, or any
number of people with whom a Self comes into contact. Various
terminologies have been employed in the literature to distinguish the
degrees of significance Significant Others carry in relationship to a
Self. Perinbanayagam (2000) designates “Interactional” and
“Significant” Others in any particular instance of social interaction. The
former is the person with whom one happens to be interacting, so
essentially this person may be an insignificant other. Perinbanayagam
reserves the term Significant Other for those who may or may not be
physically present in the interaction, but who nevertheless play a
significant role in a Self’s life and can influence the Self from afar. In
an analysis of autobiographies, literary scholar Paul Eakin’s (1990:86)
equivalent of Perinbanayagam’s Significant Other is called the
“proximate other.” Eakin says the “most common form of the
relational life [is] the self’s story viewed through the lens of its relation
with some key other person, sometimes a sibling, friend, or lover, but
most often a parent—we might call such an individual the proximate
other to signify the intimate tie to the relational autobiographer.”
It follows then that the Significant Other is often approached as
one Self in a dyadic relationship with another Self, where one Self is
the focus and the other is, at least temporarily, playing a supportive
role. Philosopher Martin Buber’s ([1923] 1958) formulation of I and
Thou, a largely egalitarian and mutual relationship that he placed in
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opposition to the I-It relationship, which was one of subject-object, is
illustrative of this. Buber thought the individual, as a fundamentally
relational being, has an innate yearning for connection with others.
Buber’s presumption that social interaction constitutes a necessary
condition for the development of a whole person is, as you may recall,
not unlike Lacan and Mead above. In all three, it is the developing
child’s dyadic interplay with familial Significant Others that precipitates
the emergence of a soul (Buber), an Unconscious (Lacan), and a
Meiotic Self (Mead). However, it is the symbolic interaction with
multiple Significant Others, a community of Others, sometimes
referred to as a “primary group” (Cooley 1962), that gives rise to
Mead’s Generalized Other.

The Meiotic Self.
In Mead’s formulation of a very socially-founded Self, the Self is
composed of an “I,” the active, creative aspect of the Self that
responds to the “Me,” the part of the Self that eventually internalizes
the Generalized Other(s) and represents the self-image people form as
they see themselves reflected in the actions and reactions of others
toward them. The Self cannot come into being without this division,
that is, without the objectification of the Self, the attempt to view
oneself from the standpoint of others. The Me and the I then carry on
a spiraling dialogue—the Me reflecting the Generalized Other and the I
creatively responding—through which the individual’s choices and
behaviors are conditioned but not determined.
This concept of the splitting of the Self is an essential element of
most psychoanalytical thought as well (Socor 1997). Lacan, for
instance, proposed a “mirror stage” of development, a pre-linguistic
phase in which the infant becomes capable of a self-reflective stance;
it is the transition from experiencing one’s “self” as fragmented,
partial, and segmented, to being able to view one’s self as an integral
object (Weiner & Rosenwald 1993). According to such thought, the
meiotic process occurs, in a psychologically healthy individual, during
early childhood without much effort on the part of the individual. I
refer to this initial, mostly involuntary, division of the self into two
essential parts as the basal Meiotic Self. However, a number of
scholars acknowledge the Self’s ability to divide into multiple selves.
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One could legitimately argue that the voices of these Selves are
merely the voices of the Generalized Others and the Significant Others
pertinent to a particular Self, but in the literature they are treated as
their own entities. I divide these potential divisions into three types:
reflexivity, mind-body split, and a self-protective split.
Many scholars of the self refer to the first type of split-self as a
“condition of reflexivity,” or as Mead (1964) would say, the ability to
take oneself as an object. Roger Bromley (2000) defines reflexivity as
the ability to relate to oneself externally and to recover that
continuously “othered” self. Linde (1993) argues that without the
property of reflexivity a self is not a fully functioning social self. The
Self should be able to, in a sense, stand aside and ask itself “How am I
doing?” as an observer of its own life. Assuming that people desire a
good self, or one that is perceived as good by others, Linde
(1993:121) suggests that “reflexivity requires the narrator to separate
him- or herself from the protagonist of his or her narrative in order to
observe, reflect upon, and correct the self that is being created.” This
is not unlike the self-therapy that most people do when they assume a
self-observatory role to discuss (within themselves or aloud while
driving in the car) the costs and benefits of a potential decision or to
rehash an experience to achieve a sensible account.
Whereas a reflexive Self is a daily occurrence among healthy
Selves, some splits feel more imposed upon the Self by life’s traumas
or employed reluctantly by the Self as a mechanism to cope with
trauma. Various life disruptions can lead to the experience of oneself
as “the Other.” This can be a mind-body or spirit-flesh division or one
in which the Self essentially amputates a part of itself for protective
purposes. For instance, upon the occurrence of a physical disruption,
such as disability or ill health, people often experience the body as an
“Other,” a stranger to one’s Self. As if in dissent, the body refuses to
move in synchronization with one’s mental commands or with
effortless ease. With such incongruity, the unity of body and Self can
no longer be taken for granted. Or, occasionally the company of
certain individuals or situations compels us to divide the Self as a
protective strategy. Sennett & Cobb (1972), for instance, discuss how
an alienated worker might “divide” him- or herself so that only part of
his/her Self is subjected to humiliation; only one part is “othered.”
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“Dividing the self defends against the pain a person would otherwise
feel, if he had to submit the whole of himself to a society which makes
his position a vulnerable and anxiety-laden one” (1972:208). Similarly,
in the film A Thousand Acres, based on Jane Smiley’s 1991 book of the
same name, a story about incest, the eldest daughter recounts that
each time her father came to her in the night, she separated her Self
from her body so that he was only raping a soulless shell. As medical
anthropologist Gay Becker (1997) has noted, deep discomfort, even
agony, can accompany such compulsory partition of the Self.

The Marginalized Other
The Marginalized Other (my terminology) is the Other whose
identification and utilization is of most recent currency. Whereas the
Generalized Other and Significant Other were generally conceived as
having similar structures and qualities as the Self (indeed because
they bestow some of their own content to the Self), the Marginalized
Other is mostly about difference or ambiguity of one degree or
another. Usually the difference has a negative connotation, but
sometimes a romanticized one, such as in Elliot Gaines’ (2005)
exploration of the notion of India as an “exotic other,” one that seems
to exhibit exciting and fascinating, but still unusual, qualities.
At one end of this difference continuum is the person or group
that represents a standard deviation from the mean or that lacks
sufficient clout or legitimacy to warrant being named specifically, as in
“Christians, Jews and others,” or “apples, bananas, and other fruit.”
The named groups represent the center (or the Self), while the
unnamed reside at the cultural, sometimes also the societal,
periphery. Sometimes the Marginalized Other reflects an ambiguous
status, when it is not clear what its status is or in which extant
category it should reside. For instance, Maria Root (1999) speaks of bior multiracial persons as Others because they don’t fit into presumably
discrete racial categories.
At the other end, the Marginalized Other is frequently
constructed as the binary opposite of the Center. As the Self
constructs itself, it seeks to distinguish itself from others; in so doing,
it essentially constructs the Other with the remnants or undesirable
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elements of cultural material. In Berglund’s (1994) words,
Marginalized Others are “those persons negatively constructed in the
dominant symbolic order.” Hence, essentially the Other embodies the
slough of the dominant center’s character. They become dummy
variables, so to speak; that is, women are the “not-males,” people of
color the “non-Whites,” and immigrants the “not-Americans.” Literary
theorist Terry Eagleton (1983: 132) thus writes:
Woman is the opposite, the “other” of man; she is nonman, defective man, assigned a chiefly negative value in
relation to the male first principle. But equally man is what he is
only by virtue of ceaselessly shutting out his other or opposite,
defining himself in antithesis to it, and his whole identity is
therefore caught up and put at risk in the very gesture by which
he seeks to assert his unique, autonomous existence.
Ghassan Hage (2005) similarly discusses the Lebanese
Maronites’ othering of the Druze religious minority. Hage describes the
process of othering the Druze in such a way that it conjures the
psychoanalytic image of the creation of the repressed Unconscious
(the not-Conscious).
[The Maronites] start thinking of wretched people, hewers
of wood, etc. That is, they invoke and collapse the other into the
very class images that they have banished from their definition
of themselves and their white people. Likewise with skin colour:
one systematically represses the whiteness of the other and the
non-whiteness within the self to end up with a white self and a
non-white other….This also shows how, through this selective
aestheticiszation, racialized thought manages to create a sense
of absolute difference between self and other (p. 202).
In this sense, individuals and groups are “othered,” (a verb
connoting objectification and powerlessness of Others). They are
defined in such a way that they are pushed to, or just beyond, the
perimeters of cultural spaces, where they reside on the subordinate
side of power dyads. If they are particularly unlucky, they may be
doubly or trebly othered (Zaborowska, 1995); that is, if they are,
perhaps, women of color, or Muslim and disabled, or—heaven forbid-an aged, lesbian cult member. The subordinate and unclear status of
these Others buttresses the dominant place of the Self and Center in a
culture’s common sense (Nelson 2001).
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The Nonhuman Other
Nonhuman Others is a very recent idea, at least to the extent
that it is garnering any utility, and it remains a largely undeveloped
concept relative to the other Others. Generally, what is meant by this
term “nonhuman others” are nonhuman animals. The (non-natural
science) literature on the social aspect of animals is growing rapidly,
but it is also quickly shifting to a literature of the Self. While some
scholars are attempting to define animals as “subjective Others”
(Irvine 2004) or “nonverbal Others” (Sanders & Arluke 1993), other
scholars (Alger & Alger 1997) are more interested in establishing a
Self for animals.
However, the possibility of nonhuman others has been attended
to in the past as well. In Buber’s (1957) I-Thou relationship, two of the
possible Thous are abstract symbolic systems, such as books and art,
and nature. One could argue that the former is the product of humans
and, therefore, does not count as a Nonhuman Other, but nature
would embody animals, plants, and perhaps inanimate (though often
formerly animate) objects, such as soil, rock, or water. According to
Buber, nature and symbolic systems are Thous in the sense that
Selves are capable of receiving confirmation through them. This gives
rise to the possibility that inanimate nonnatural objects, such as toys,
might be Others as well. As will be discussed below, the Wilson ball in
the film “The Castaway” (or the inflatable Bianca in the film “Lars and
the Real Girl”) would fall into this category.

Issues of Power: Territorial Boundaries and
Agency & Resistance
The necessity of the Others’ existence for the development of a
healthy Self bestows on Others an inherent, though frequently
unrecognized and unrealized, power. Although virtually any reference
to Self and Other privileges the Self over the Other, early conceptions
of the Other found in G.H. Mead, Alfred Schutz, and Charles Cooley,
for instance, painted Others that were largely benevolently agentic2;
after all, these Others were often familial or friendly Significant Others
(primary groups) and distillations of group attitudes (Generalized
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Others) that reflected a neat Durkheimian consensus that acted as
guides to emerging Selves. While such conceptions were not ignorant
of conflicts between and within Selves and Others, many of these
conceptions seemed to gloss over the internecine struggles that can
occur in the formulation of Self and Other. Today those struggles have
risen to the forefront with the focus on Marginalized Others.
Positioning theory (Harre & Moghaddam 2003) in psychology
recognizes that the status of any particular Other may be situationally
relative and is conferred by the Self through numerous strategies,
such as address and naming (Perinbanayagam 2000), distribution of
resources, and the creation of standards and rules. But, ultimately, the
ongoing creation of Selves and Others, and their continuous interplay,
is inevitably about power and influence. It is a tussle over the content
and quality of Selves and Others and over position—not only in regard
to who’s on top of a hierarchy or who gets to be the protagonist, but
also over cultural territory, where lines are drawn in cultural sands,
fences make good neighbors, and borders serve as both battlegrounds
and locations for liaisons.

Borders & Boundaries
To preface the discussion about agency and power, one must
discuss boundaries and borders, as they are inherent to one degree or
another in the relationship of Self and Other. To do so, we must return
to psychoanalytic literature, in which the subject separates physically,
psychologically, and eternally from the mother. In doing so, egoboundaries are formed. While most psychoanalytic literature
recognizes the necessary relational role of Others in the development
of the Self, psychic health is assumed to be accompanied by some
degree of separateness from others; in a healthy individual the
boundaries between “Self” and “Other” should be carefully
circumscribed.
Boundaries are most often discussed in the context of
Significant Others and Marginalized Others. Women, for instance, are
frequently said to exhibit ill-defined, porous ego boundaries.
Psychoanalyst Nancy Chodorow (1978) explains that the female’s
separation from the mother is characterized by greater ambivalence
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and confusion over ego boundaries than is the parallel process for
males. From this, it is then often concluded that women tend to have
more trouble maintaining healthy ego boundaries; they become too
easily embedded in others’ lives and identities. Their own needs get
lost in the needs of others. Although speaking without reference to
gender, sociologist Arlie Hochschild (1983) describes the “otherdirected” false self, the altruist, as the person who is overly concerned
with the needs of others. When overdeveloped, this false, altruistic self
oversteps its boundaries, bonding its true self to the group’s welfare
[italics mine].3 Occasionally, this ability to penetrate boundaries is
comprehended as a positive quality, even in women, as it is argued,
for instance, that because of their porous boundaries women can
incorporate Otherness more easily than can men.
Despite the supposition that boundaries between Self and
Others are essential to healthy personality development and perhaps
to social relationships, some scholars recognize that the Desire of the
Other simultaneously wars with these erected boundaries. Buber
([1923] 1958), Joas (1998), and others assert that the Self seeks
fusion--sexually, spiritually—with Others and can only experience that
fusion by transgressing the boundaries of the Self. According to Italian
sociologist Alberto Melucci (1996), the apparent differences between
Self and Other, which are constructed and delineated by discrete
borders, entice and seduce us to cross over. Yet the Self fears the loss
of identity that might accompany the penetration of borders.
[E]ncountering another always entails putting into
question something of ourselves and of our uniqueness and
venturing into an unknown land only to discover what we lack:
exposing oneself to otherness implies a challenge to one’s selfsufficiency and the recognition that the other is different
precisely because s/he possesses what we do not have… (pp.
101-2)
The psychological lingo of boundaries often converts to
“margins” and “peripheries” when discussing subordinate Marginalized
Others or to “borders” when Marginalized Others are afforded (or
assume) increased power and agency. Most of the time, residing on or
beyond the border of mainstream society is a precarious, peripheral
position. For instance, Lisa Park (2005) describes the border location
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of Asian Americans, who as a “model minority” ride the border
between the White Americans at the Center and “bad minorities” in the
outlying cultural territory. Park says,
Asian Americans find themselves standing on a “fault line,”
vulnerable to the slightest quake or change in social boundaries
between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Their social role as a mythical model
minority requires that they continuously exhibit their patriotism
or their deservingness of social citizenship through consumptive
displays. Otherwise, they may fall into the “bad” immigrant
category and experience even greater limitations on their social
citizenship claims (p. 12).
However, it has also been argued that such a border position
provides, perhaps as a consolation prize (as with the meek who
eventually inherit the earth), some double-edged characteristics that
can be construed as forms of power for Marginalized Others. In this
case, being “othered” supposedly supplies Marginalized Others with
keen insight and cultural knowledge unavailable to the Center.
Surviving in and successfully negotiating the Self’s or Center’s world
requires Marginalized Others to make intelligence-gathering forays
across the border, thus rendering them more familiar with and skilled
in negotiating both domains. The Center, on the other hand, can
maintain its dominance even while lacking such knowledge, that is,
while lacking understanding of the Other, the capability of seeing
oneself as the Other, and the illumination that that capability would
afford (Becker 1997).
Likewise, because of their contrast (difference) and their
sashaying back and forth across cultural borders, Marginalized Others
create “boundary moments,” which are, as defined by Stephen Knadler
(2002: xvii), “moments of disruption when people become conscious of
their membership in a…group because of their experience of rejection
or counteridentification by a member of another group.” Michael
Holquist (1999: 101) argues that “the mind is structured so that the
world is always perceived according to contrast.” Nothing can be
perceived except against the perspective of something else; there is
no figure without a background. It is only in those moments of
contrasting disruption that we see who we “really” are, that we see the
nuances of our identity, as when one holds a “white” paint chip against
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a piece of white paper, only to discover the “white” paint chip is
actually a pale shade of blue.
On the other hand, because racial ethnic minority groups and
women must be experienced in both worlds, it is occasionally argued
that they themselves are divided, possessing a double consciousness,
which can have negative or positive consequences for themselves or
others. W.E.B. Du Bois ([1903] 1979), in The Souls of Black Folk,
argued that the African American had no true self-consciousness.
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense
of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of
measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in
amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,--an
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (p. 3).
Brownley & Kimmich (1999) argue that women autobiographers
are likewise double voiced, because they view themselves in two
dramatically different ways—first through the eyes of society as the
stereotypical feminine object but then also in ways that conflict with
the constraining stereotype. Being doubly conscious or doubly voiced
(read also: forked tongue) can lead to a double life, which may include
an element of duplicity manifested in various forms. Prime examples
would be Black people passing for whites, literally, or as “oreos” and
women deceiving men, particularly in the arena of orgasms (Forrester
1997).

Agentic Others
The most agentic Other is the Significant Other, which plays a
strong and creative role in a Self’s initial and continuous identity
formation. At minimum, the Self’s identity is a collaborative, relational
effort with Significant Others. Paul Eakin (1990:63) suggests that we
learn how to be a certain kind of person in conversation with others;
that is, identity formation is socially and discursively transacted.
Likewise, sociologist Erving Goffman ([1956] 1967:84-85) argued that
a person’s constituent personal and social identities cannot be realized
in isolation:
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Rather the individual must rely on others to complete the
picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint only
certain parts….While it may be true that the individual has a
unique self all his own, evidence of that possession is thoroughly
a product of joint ceremonial labor.
In a person’s earliest developmental stage, the Significant Other
plays a pivotal role, both in the formation of the Self and in the
formation of that Self’s Others. Without the verbal and nonverbal
interaction between Significant Others, particularly parents, and a
child, the Generalized Other and the basal Meiotic Self would not form.
As the circle of Significant Others expands in the life of a Self, the
Generalized Other is formed and wends its way into the Me. Finally,
the number and content of our multiple Selves are constrained and
shaped by what “closely enmeshed others accord” (Goffman
1971:367).
While the Significant Other is usually viewed as using its agency
benevolently, it clearly has the potential to exercise varying levels of
control over the Self’s creation. As Jenkins (2000) points out, we know
who we are because Others tell us. Narrative scholar Randall (1995)
says Others story us. The stories Others tell about us, which Randall
calls “outside-in stories,” help to create the social climate in which our
lives are lived and to determine the range of options and opportunities
by which our lives are bound. In fact, a Significant Other can speak on
behalf of the Self. This is most obvious in the case of children, who are
still developing their own selves, their own voices, and have little
control over their environment. As Steedman (quoted in Eakin 1990)
asserts, “children are always episodes in someone else’s narrative.”
Glowinski et al. (2001) suggests that even the infant’s cry is
interpreted by Significant Others as speech, as when the parent
responds to the infant’s cry with the explanation “Oh, he wants his
diaper changed.” Cahill (1998) takes the parents’ identity-conferring
role one step back, acknowledging that even prior to birth, parents,
abetted by ultrasound technology and genetic tests, labor in the
production of their offsprings’ identities. For instance, parents of an
active fetus might jumpstart their child’s identity with statements such
as “He’s already a strong kicker.” In return, family and friends may
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find evidence of the parents’ announced identity in the infant’s later
conduct and treat him or her accordingly.
In some cases, Significant Others may seize the opportunity to
control an adult’s identity when s/he lacks the means to control his/her
own identity. Cahill (1998) and Holstein & Gubrium (2000) proffer
examples of the strong role Significant Others play in the production of
Selves for disabled people or persons with Alzheimer’s Disease. One
might refer to the recent case of Terry Schiavo, a wife comatose for 13
years. Although her autopsy revealed her to be brain dead, Schiavo’s
parents and brother had successfully created a vital public persona on
her behalf. One might consider who Terry Schiavo would have been if
a less interested party had been responsible for her care. In these
latter cases, the person contributes little of his/her own labor to the
creation of its Self. It is this ability of some Others that begs the
question “Who is the Other here?” Is the Self just a vessel for the
Other in these cases?
In essence then, the relationship between the Self and
Significant Other can become a battlefield over who gets to be Self and
Other in each dyadic relational instance and over the content of the
identity each Self will be allowed to have. It is this element of
interpersonal struggle, which can be subtle or overt, that is often
missing when scholars describe the process of narrating or making a
Self. For instance, “Self A” may have a particular image of his or her
Self, while Significant Others B through E have different images of that
person or at least Self A suspects that they do. Self A needs their
feedback to try to assess which, if any, of those Selves are “really”
hers, but directly asking for the feedback is risky and appears selfabsorbed. Frequently, even if asked, Others withhold their feedback
from Self A, though they may freely tell other bystanders what they
think of Self A. Perhaps it is not their intent to keep Self A incomplete;
maybe they intend only to protect themselves in some way, but the
outcome is that their withholding makes Self A’s self-creation more
uncertain. Illustrative of this function is Crooks, the black farmhand in
Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men ([1937] 1979). As the only Black
farmhand, Crooks [who is described (p.299) as a man who “had
reduced himself to nothing. There was no personality, no ego….,”]
resides in a separate shack, isolated from the white farmhands.
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Lennie, the mentally retarded protagonist who has accidentally killed
two people, suggests to Crooks that he come live with Lennie and his
brother George when they finally buy the farm they’ve been saving
for. Crooks thinks such a living arrangement might resolve the lack of
certainty about his self-perceptions that accompanies his isolation. He
states this in considerably less postmodern jargon:
A guy sets alone out here at night, maybe readin’ books or
thinkin’, an’ he got nothing to tell him what’s so an’ what ain’t
so. Maybe if he sees somethin’, he don’t know whether it’s right
or not. He can’t turn to some other guy and ast him if he sees it
too. He can’t tell. He got nothing to measure by. I seen things
out here. I wasn’t drunk. I don’t know if I was asleep. If some
guy was with me, he could tell me I was asleep, an’ then it
would be all right (p. 292).
Occasionally, Others tell Self A what they think of him/her, and
Self A may find the revelation shocking, and then a battle ensues.
Person A must convince them that they are wrong, must persuade
them to let her out of that particular identity box. A similar power
struggle can occur among the Meiotic Selves, particularly when the
division of the basal Self into multiple Selves is imposed by external
exigencies. As McAdams (1993:115) asserts, the splitting of the self is
occasionally a discordant one, as when one is afraid to let one set of
his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere. When there are
multiple, particularly contradictory images, of a Self, one is left
wondering which are the “real” or “faux” selves, much the way women
feel in a clothing store’s dressing room, where multiple mirrors and
unnatural lighting show the uneven terrain of one’s aging body from
every angle. Like circus mirrors, some of the reflections reflect a taller
self, a stockier self, or so on. One leaves the mirrored room wondering
which image is the one closest to “reality.” Then the struggle is to
suppress the undesirable Other(s) within the Self. Or as discussed
earlier, when the body becomes the Self’s Other, the flesh and spirit
resort to fisticuffs to determine which will have more agency.

Convolutions of Victimhood and Agency
Power is conventionally conceived as control that derives from
physical or mental strength, aggressiveness, or a disproportionate
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share of resources. However, weakness and passivity can occasionally
achieve the same ends. For instance, in the earlier discussion of mindbody splits where a weakened body is viewed as an Other by its Self,
the body, in its weakened condition, ends up by default exercising
quite a bit of control and constraint over the frustrated Self. And many
a spouse will attest to the fact that a passive or lethargic Significant
Other can, with no use of force, redistribute the bulk of unwanted
household labor to the Self. So an Other does not need to be in an
authoritative position to achieve control of a Self; even victims can
control through sympathy or guilt.
In fact, Others are sometimes othered in partial or contradictory
ways. While I am mostly discussing Othering as a cultural process,
Others can be marginalized structurally as well. That is, often cultural
othering frequently results in structural othering, by which I mean they
have less access to society’s resources, as evidenced in lower rates of
education, lower incomes, less control over most institutions. When
individuals or groups are only (by only I don’t mean to imply that it is
less damaging) culturally othered, they may be able to muster those
structural resources and use them to resist their othering or use them
to create a situation in which they become the Self/Center in relation
to an Other. For instance, Jews have historically been a group that has
been victim to cultural othering, through negative stereotyping and
genocide. However, compared to many other racial-ethnic groups,
they have to a lesser degree exhibited structural othering. As an ethnic
group, they have one of the highest median incomes and highest rates
of education. These resources have better enabled them to survive
their Othered status and utilize that status to create a relatively
powerful political State.
The agency attributed to various Others frequently exhibits such
contrary qualities and ranges on a continuum from subtle and
subversive to overt and imposing. The Unconscious Other is frequently
portrayed as inaccessible and repressed. According to Lacan, the
Unconscious is successfully “fenced off” by language, the Self’s
defense against the Unconscious (Benstock 1999 or 1988). Buttressing
this image, Gerald Peters (1998) portrays the Unconscious Other as a
helpless pathetic character, likening it to “a silent and suspended self
trapped behind all language, one that sheds tears never seen, one that
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cries to be let out but is never heard.” However, other portrayals
depict the Unconscious as imparting discord and agitation as it
reminds the Self of its lack of unity (Hunsaker 1999). This Unconscious
exercises its power in a frightening, surreptitious manner, by locating
holes in the Self’s fortress-like symbolic structure and ferreting its way
through. Clement (1983:232) describes the Unconscious as a trickster
who makes us say what we don’t mean, manifested as [Freudian] slips
of the tongue. “When you use the wrong word, when you say a word
other than the one you meant to say, it’s not really you who is
speaking. You are spoken….You are just a conduit for that which has
decided to escape from within at all costs.”
Similarly, the Marginalized Other’s agency fluctuates from a
powerless victim to aggressive and furtive. As its name implies, the
Marginalized Other is commonly portrayed as peripheral, subordinate,
inferior, oppressed and powerless. This victim-object is created by
Centers who “othered” it. While many scholars clearly distinguish
between the Center and Marginalized Other, the oppressor and the
oppressed, many poststructuralists argue that the Other has agency
only insofar as it participates in its own denigration (Punday 2003). For
instance, according to de Beauvoir (1971): “When man makes of
woman the Other, he may then expect her to manifest deep-seated
tendencies toward complicity. Thus woman may fail to lay claim to the
status of subject because she lacks definite resources, because she
feels the necessary bond that ties her to man regardless of reciprocity,
and because she is often very well pleased with her role as the Other
(xxxiii).” Although de Beauvoir thought women were different from
other oppressed groups because of their widespread internalization of
negative myths about women, the same internalization of self-hatred
has been attributed to racial and religious minority groups as well.
However, in a number of aspects, Marginalized Others
supposedly wield powers similar to the Unconscious. For instance,
psychologist Wendy Hollway (1993) argues that men’s desire for the
Other/Mother, which they fear because it induces vulnerability, gives
women unrecognized power. Hollway argues that men hold ambiguous
feelings toward vaginal sex. In the vagina men feel engulfed in the
love of the Other/Mother, but such inundation simultaneously reminds
them of the power women exert over them. Benstock (1999) argues
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that Marginalized Others who occupy positions of internal exclusion
within society—women, blacks, Jews, homosexuals, and others who
exist at the margins of society—puncture the Self’s defense (as does
the Unconcious), attempting to defeat its fencing off network. The
penetrating gaze of these Others threatens the Self, reminding the Self
of its own internal split, which in turn explains the Self’s need to
dismiss or repress the Others. Similarly, Anoop Nayak (2005) defines
racialization as the application of imagined racial “essences” to others.
The process of racialization, however, affects the identity not only of
those who are subjected to its power but also those who racialize
Others. According to Nayak, these Others return to trouble the Self in
unconscious fantasies and unspoken desires. As an act of projection,
racialization involves spinning a psychic web of fear, envy, and desire,
which binds the bodies of racialized others in a silver threat of white
anxiety. At the very least, because Marginalized Others rarely forget
their position as an Other, to the extent that they continue to remind
the Self/Center of that fact, they become a thorn in the flesh of the
Self/Center.

Resistance
The Unconscious Other’s propensity to dig its way through the
defensive language network, the Significant Other’s ability to create
identity material for or withhold it from the Self, or the body’s
occasional revolt against the Self’s control could be interpreted as
forms of resistance to subordination, to a lifeless role. However, more
salient of late has been the resistance of Marginalized Others, who
traditionally have held a clearly more peripheral role.
As mentioned earlier, by definition, Marginalized Others are
subordinate others. However, in recent years they have been accorded
the possibility of agency sufficient to resist their marginalization and/or
to counter the dominant Center. Throughout history, Marginalized
Others have resisted their subordination by telling jokes about or
mimicking the dominant group (Wasson 1994), grumbling to one
another, or composing and singing satirical or political songs about
their oppressors (Linde 1993). But aside from momentarily lightening
the burden of powerlessness, these tactics rarely transform the
position of the Marginalized Other.
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More decisively, Marginalized Others resist and confront
othering by developing a tolerance for contradictions (Bromley 2000,
Rosaldo 1989) or by using the material from which they were
constructed to mount a campaign to privilege the characteristics of the
Others. For instance, Stone (2002) argues that the marginalized
position is not simply one of deprivation, but additionally is an
entryway to realms of knowledge and feeling that the dominant culture
hides or denies. Stone quotes author Toni Morrison who wrote that her
marginalized position as a black person and as a woman gave her
“access to a range of emotions and perceptions that were unavailable
to people who were neither” (p. 71).
According to narrative scholar Zaborowska (1995), this
bicultural, in-between identity “may be the only kind capable of
engaging in intercultural dialogue and of remaking the host culture.”
Although Lentin (2004) writes that Irish migrant women remain as
“barbarian[s] beyond the pale of civilization, forever consigned to play
the role of the ontological, political, economic and cultural other,” she
also argues that their stories are not only the product of negation and
damage but also of resistance and survival.
Such a vantage point is increasingly being shared in written
narratives and memoirs, such as through the Personal Narratives
Group (1989) headquartered in Minnesota. PNG supports this strategy
based on the belief that “nondominant social groups (women in
general, racially or ethnically oppressed people, lower-class people,
lesbians) are often particularly effective sources of counterhegemonic
insight because they expose the dominant ideology as particularist
rather than universal, and because they reveal the reality of a life that
defies or contradicts the rules.” Fand (1999) claims that Others have
the power to change the very language and social structures that
constituted them in the first place, so that, for instance, women
formed from patriarchal influences may nevertheless expose the
contradictions embedded in patriarchal discourse and institutions and
create a new dynamic between power “centers” and their “margins.”
To illustrate, Marginalized Others are often created as opposites
of Selves, for instance, men as rational, women as emotional. Literary
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scholar Helen Buss (2002) argues that in choosing to write an
autobiography, women must enter the discourse of man. In seeking
cultural authority, they must portray an individualist selfhood attuned
to personal achievement, when they really wish to tell a story
characterized by absence, silence, vulnerability, immanence,
interpenetration, one that is nonlogocentric, unpredictable, and
childish. By Lacanian definition, many of these attributes are the very
ones suppressed by the male child to enter the world of the adult, to
leave the imaginary realm for the symbolic. Similarly, literary scholar
Paul Eakin (1990) mentions that in the study of autobiographical
writing, women’s and men’s autobiographical styles are distinguished
by binary characteristics: women’s as collective, relational, and
nonlinear and discontinuous, while men’s style is individualistic,
autonomous, and linear. Ironically, these same dichotomies frequently
are used to distinguish racial minority values and orientations from
those of White Europeans. That is, racial-ethnic minorities are often
said to be oriented to the collective over the individual, to nonlinear
over linear thinking, to interdependence over independence (Stone
1988, for instance).
However, in the past decade or so, Russian philosopher Mikhail
Bahktin’s work on cultural and literary theory has risen to the forefront
in literary analysis. His concepts of “dialogism” and “heteroglossia” are
particularly utilized in discussions of Others, as Bahktin argues that the
representation of multiple voices is essential to authenticity. Fand
(1999) describes Bahktin’s concept of dialogism as privileging female
characteristics over male. That is, Bahktin’s dialogism emphasizes
relating and negotiating (rather than isolating and polarizing
positions), responding to concrete particulars (rather than to abstract
principles), and intuitive thinking (rather than linear thinking).
Although such strategies continue to propagate problematic dualisms,
by turning these dualisms on their head, Marginalized Others, in a
backhanded way, argue that women and people of color are deeper
and more layered than men and Whites, whose characteristics are by
implication unilayered and egocentric.
One final way of resisting Otherhood is to transform an Other
into a Self. This is currently happening in the literature on animalhuman relationships. Generally, animals, if addressed at all, have been
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treated as groups, or perhaps as individual pets, subordinate and
marginal to humans. At best they have been viewed, as mentioned
above, as Nonhuman Others. Work by Alger & Alger (1997), Irvine
(2004), and Sanders & Arluke (1993) has argued that animals are at
least “subjective Others” and perhaps have Selves. To achieve this
end, these scholars do away with the linguistic foundation of the Self
that is found in Lacan and Mead and instead use a more emotive,
senses-based Self,4 arguing that what is minimally needed for a Self
are four facets (which they derive from psychologist William James’
[1890] work): a sense of agency (self-willed or self-controlled action),
a sense of coherence (that is, a sense of being a physical whole), a
sense of affectivity (feelings), and a sense of self-history (memory).5

Current and Future Research
Little empirical research incorporates the concepts of the Other.
Partial explanation for this absence lies in the fact that the conceptions
are often difficult, if not impossible, to measure. For instance, being
that the Unconscious Other is, as its name implies, unconscious, it is
an Other that is merely speculative. The Self has no ability to access
the Unconscious, let alone measure it. Like a god, its existence can’t
be proven. Nevertheless, the belief that it might exist may exert
measurable influence on social behavior. That is, an individual may
avoid inebriation or a drug-induced high for fear that such a state may
weaken the Self’s defenses and his or her repressed thoughts and
emotions may embarrassingly leak out, bequeathing to other people
more information about him/her than s/he has about her/himself. To
what extent does belief in the Unconscious Other succeed in controlling
or motivating behavior and what types of behaviors are more
susceptible to this belief? These may be more fruitful questions for
future research.
One example of research that puts a twist on Lacan’s
Unconscious Other is social psychologist Phillip Shon’s (2002)
discussion of mass murder by young white youth, as in the 1999
Columbine murders. Shon adopts Bracher’s (1995) terminology, which
defines Lacan’s Other as the Self’s “internalized ultimate authority.”
Shon then suggests that these youth desire the Desire of the Other.
However, in this case the Other has been externalized; the U.S.
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government & country become the Other, the ultimate authority,
whom the youth hope desires them. In today’s multicultural society,
these white youth think this authority now desires minorities, as
evidenced in enforcement of preference laws, such as affirmative
action, hate crimes statues, gender equity, etc. It is the classic Cain
and Abel story; the jealous youth kill the Other’s object of desire.
Some sociological research has included the Generalized Other.
Himsel & Goldberg (2003), for instance, studied marital satisfaction in
regard to household division of labor. They found that satisfaction with
the distribution of household labor varied according to which reference
wives and husbands chose for comparison. Wives tended to compare
their situation to their peers’, while husbands frequently compared
chore distribution to their mothers’ situations. When husbands
compared themselves to their wives, they often acknowledged that
their wives assumed a greater share of family work. However, Himsel
& Goldberg also found that a number of men, particularly those in
dual-earner marriages, invoked for comparison not a real person but
rather a Generalized Other, a putative typical dad, who performed less
family work than they did. These husbands described an image of a
Generalized Other whose meager contributions to family work
enhanced their own relative involvement. Similarly, Gager’s (1998)
study on father involvement—although it did not apply the term
“Generalized Other”--found that dads often generated an image of a
“do-nothing dad” to whom they would favorably compare.
Scott’s (2004) study on shyness uses both the Generalized
Other and what I have called the Meiotic Self. Scott understands
shyness as a dialogue between the I and the Me of Mead’s social self
(what I have termed the basal Meiotic Self). She distinguishes
between embarrassment, which is a reaction of acute selfconsciousness about a faux pas that has already occurred, and
shyness, which is anticipatory anxiety about imagined or expected
blunders. According to Scott, shyness is caused by monitoring one’s
own action compared to a generalized image of what she calls the
“competent other,” an estimation of how socially skilled others are in a
particular social situation.
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The Generalized Other was conceived by Mead as an organized
community or social group that gives rise to a communal attitude
about aspects of common social activity. This communal attitude must
be taken up by the Self in order to fully develop. In doing so, the
community exercises social control over the conduct of its individuals.
Mead’s concept seems to assume that the Self takes up these social
attitudes “correctly;” that is, there is little room for Mead’s Self to
create a Generalized Other that is conducive to the Self’s desires. Yet
the above described research suggests that individuals may tweak the
Generalized Other to fit their needs and that the individual may rely on
faulty information to concoct a Generalized Other. In both cases, the
Generalized Other is a dynamic Other that may change over the
course of one’s lifetime, reflecting shifting social structures and
cultural mores.
This leads to potential research questions: Where did the fathers
obtain the information that comprised their Generalized Other? From
friends/peers who say they do less (but perhaps do more and don’t
want to admit it)? Do these fathers seek out other husbands who do
less in order to make themselves look better? Hypothetically, if a Self
perceives that the general attitude about extramarital affairs, let’s say,
is conservative but then hears a news report that extramarital affairs
are increasing or finds that several friends are partaking in such
affairs, does such information about what the Generalized Other is
doing or thinking allow the Self to now consider what he/she might not
have considered and how long would that time-lag be? How do
persons choose among competing Generalized Others?
Wiener & Rosenwald’s (1993) work on diaries incorporates the
concept of multiples selves (which I sorted under Meiotic Self). The
authors point out that diarists may keep several diaries reflecting
different selves, multiple selves, which can then confront one another.
Thus, the diary performs a “mirror” function, making Self into an Other
or observing oneself as an object.
By writing about oneself in the diary one creates a picture of the
self as a whole. One may also become aware of the self as
divided into subject and object, the experiencer and the
observer of experience. Beyond the transitional object function
of the diary, which serves to help the self differentiate from
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others, this mirror function of the diary helps to distinguish not
only the ‘me’ from the ‘not-me’; it also embodies the division
between ‘I, the subject’ and ‘me, the object’ of reflection. (p.
44)
Similarly, Brendan Stone’s (2006) analysis of the diaries of two
psychotic patients, shows that the diary functioned as the Other that
aided the patient in rebuilding its shattered Self, to regain a voice that
had been stolen, to reclaim an identity by dialoging with its Other.
Such research could go further in asking what circumstances are
more likely to produce, or what types of people are more likely to
adopt, a strategy of multiple selves. Sennett & Cobb’s writing
(mentioned above) suggests that situations of alienation (in their case,
workplace situations) may either impose or cause a Self to adopt a
strategy of self-othering, but one can easily imagine other alienating
experiences (see, for example, Rayson’s (1999) work on JapaneseAmerican women’s experience in wartime relocation centers, where
she says their “split identity” was exacerbated), such as where one is
situated in the midst of a new Generalized Other or in cases of rape or
domestic abuse, where dividing, or separating from, the Self would be
a logical coping mechanism.
In regard to the Self as composed of mind and body, future
research opportunities abound. Pregnancy and paralysis have always
existed as situations that have the potential to alienate body from
mind, but the aging of the babyboomers, increased organ transplants
(most recently the face) and proliferating war injuries all provide a
plethora of situations where the Self may feel othered by its body.
Cases of amnesia provide instances where bodily dysfunctions or
traumas obliterate a Self, require Significant Others to put HumptyDumpty’s Self back together again, but also paradoxically potentially
provide opportunities to construct new Selves.
The Other that has garnered a fair amount of research is the
Significant Other. Some of that research has focused on how
professionals can play the role of Significant Other for various types of
“clients.” For instance, Miller (1996) approaches the research
interviewer as the Significant Other; in this case, Miller himself was the
Interviewer/Other. Miller visualized the interviewer as playing the
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“Thou” as in Buber’s I and Thou. He found that many of the
respondents interviewed just wished to be heard out, to be listened to
and understood by an attentive other. However, he also concluded
that the Self and Other in this relationship are mutually acting as
Others for one another. The interviewer or therapist who intends to be
the Other, acting as a sounding board for a Self, may find, perhaps
unwittingly, that s/he is gradually being changed by the other person.
Similarly, Hurvitz’s (1979) work on family therapy argued that in order
to be effective, therapists needed to become significant others to their
clients.
Another set of research on Significant Others focuses on daily
dyadic relationships. Ogle & Damhorst (2003), for example, looked at
mothers and daughters as dyadic pairs, referring to each other as the
“dyadic other.” Specifically, the authors studied this relationship in
reference to dieting behavior. They found that mothers and daughters
described a process in which they used their perceptions about the
dyadic other and their relationship with that other to guide their bodyand diet-related interactions. Each attempted to exert control over
their interactions. However, although both mothers and daughters
acted as diet supporters to one another, only mothers served as
conscious socializers and safety supervisors.
A growing “unform” of autobiography combines both the
Significant Other and Self as Other (Meiotic Self). Autothanatography
is essentially a memoir about dying, in which the Other, frequently
familial, provides a map of a Self (Eakin 1990). In this death narrative,
the dying person incorporates his/her own perspective on his/her own
bodily deterioration along with the narratives of Significant Others
about the dying person. According to Susanna Egan (undated),
autothanotography reverses the usual
pattern of autobiography; it covers a brief period of time and a
single main experience, and involves other people than the
dying self often in a dialogue of shared experience….Second,
autothanatography takes on the whole business of the body….
Facing death, the body forces reversal of the normal trajectories
of autobiography. Miller [1994], again, has described the
forward-looking story about the "becoming" of a life and
describes autothanatography as an "UNbecoming."
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Recent memoirs that exemplify autothanatography include Eric
Michael’s (1997) Unbecoming, Christina Middlebrook’s (1996) Seeing
the Crab: A Memoir of Dying, and Miller’s (1996) Bequest and
Betrayal: Memoirs of a parent’s death. This form of memoir epitomizes
the social creation of the Self, and although not research, it raises
questions with potential for qualitative research. How much of one’s
Self is so to speak “vaulted” in Significant Others? And, as Significant
Others die, do they forever take with them, and hence render
inaccessible, knowledge of another’s Self? One then might imagine a
young person whose mother dies and is no longer available to answer
questions such as “Did I do such and such when I was young?” “Did I
display a certain characteristic as a child?” “Tell me the story about….”
However, even as one reaches late life, with each passing of family
members and friends, how might the remaining elder feel less a Self,
less storied? How might that impact his/her own identity and will to
live? Even without death, the unity or fullness of the Self may also
suffer during geographical transitions, as when one moves to a new
job or neighborhood, leaving behind people who knew them best and
longest and making friends with people who don’t know one’s past nor
care to ask. To what extent does the death or disappearance of the
Significant Others leave the Self incomplete or, on the other hand,
offer opportunities to create new Selves?
Finally, I have already discussed that research is being
conducted on Nonhuman Others. So far, that research is focused on
animals, primarily pets and companion animals such as cats and dogs.
It is conceivable that this will eventually expand to other animals,
particularly those that have already been studied by biologists and
naturalists.
In short, I have tried to articulate and illustrate the roles and
agency of the various Others that are usually subsidiary characters in
the story of the Self. The literature on Selves easily allows individuals
to keep rewriting their Selves with each new experience, each new
disruption. But what about the Other? Its assumed subordination to, or
at least secondary importance to, the Self produces and perpetuates a
concept of Others that is somewhat stagnant. In fact, Others intersect,
play multiple roles, and shift amoebically as they exist in a state of
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dynamic tension with the Self. A new generation of research and
narrative focusing on the Other could enlighten and enliven the role of
Others and Selves in the creation and maintenance of both social
identities and interaction.
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Norm Denzin, James A. Holstein, Robert A.
Perinbanayagam, and Phil Shon for their clarifying comments.

Notes
1. I do not intend to imply here that Others and Selves are separate entities
nor that Others have no Selves. Most Others do have Selves, though
they often go unrecognized or undervalued.
2. One early noteworthy exception to the benevolent Other was Jose Ortega y
Gasset’s (1956) notion of a malevolent Other whose goal was to
submerge the Self within it. Ortega referred to this as “alteration.” He
is discussed in Perinbanayagam (1985) as well.
3. One has to wonder whether the concept of discrete ego boundaries and
their necessity for psychic health would even arise in societies not
based on private property. Holstein & Gubrium (2000:11) relay the
story of a Western researcher who lived with the Akaramas, a tribe in
Peru. The Akaramas had no concept of the “individual;” group identity
was paramount. Even upon death, a person’s absence seemed to go
unnoticed. Eventually, the researcher left the field because he felt his
distinct “me” was being eradicated. However, the psychoanalytic and
social theory that focuses on the Other arose in societies highly
defined by the concept of property and privileging male ways of
relating, so I proceed on that premise.
4. One could still argue that Lacan’s creation of the Self could accommodate a
less language-based construction of Self, as he argues that the
psychological needs of Desire, Lack and Absence underlie human
interaction. Language enters later as a human symbolic register that is
representative of these needs.
5. While I personally would be easily convinced that animals have a Self, I
believe this search for the “minimal Self” poses some problems. The
arguments proffered are sometimes more about the humans involved
in the human-animal interaction than they are about the animals. For
instance, Irvine argues that humans seek relationships with animals
and are concerned about animal well-being, that human-animal
interaction increases in complexity over time, that animals act as
“social facilitators,” and that people name animals. Although this is
only part of Irvine’s evidence, she argues that these behaviors are
evidence that animals “give off” (as in Goffman’s (1959) “impressions
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given off”) a sense of Self or subjectivity. That may be the case, but it
is also possible that those same human behaviors may be projections
of human subjectivity onto animals because that’s how humans are
accustomed to interacting. Humans are known to name and talk to
dolls and stuffed animals and plants (Sometimes I even feel I’m
talking to a wall!). Sometimes they paint faces on and name inanimate
objects. Note the case of “Wilson” in the film The Castaway, in which
the main character, played by Tom Hanks, stranded for years on a
deserted island bestows a Self upon a volleyball, who becomes a
needed companion for Hanks. Wilson’s demise probably brought tears
to many an eye or a lump to the throat, but I don’t think many would
argue that Wilson had a Self or sense of subjectivity. In addition, the
search for a minimal Self could foreseeably have us spelunking into
the womb. At which point does a human (or animal) have the
beginnings of a Self? Given that we now know that fetuses hear and
feel in the womb and many (anal) parents now talk to, play music for,
and practice math skills with their intrauterine baby, we may
eventually hear arguments for a Prenatal Self. Is this somewhat akin
to or will this intersect with the anti-abortion search for the earliest
viable life?

References
Alger, J.M. and Alger, S.F. (1997) Beyond Mead: Symbolic Interaction
between Humans and Felines. Society and Animals: Journal of HumanAnimal Studies 5(1): 65-81
Bakhtin, M. M. (1981) The dialogic imagination. Edited by M. Holquist. Trans.
By C. Emerson and m. Holquist. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Becker, Gay. (1997) Disrupted Lives: How People create meaning in a chaotic
world. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Benstock, S. (1999) The female self engendered: autobiographical writing and
theories of selfhood. Pp. 3-13 in Brownley, M.W. and Kimmich, A.B.
(eds.) 1999. Women and Autobiography. Wilmington, DE: SR Books.
Benstock, Shari, ed. (1988) The Private Self: Theory and Practice of Women’s
Autobiographical Writings. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina Press.
Berger, Peter. (1963). Invitation to Sociology: A humanistic perspective. NY:
Doubleday.
Berglund, Betty. (1994) Postmodernism and the autobiographical subject:
Reconstructing the “other” pp 130-166 in Ashley, K., Gilmore, L., and
Peters, G. (eds.) Autobiography and Postmodernism. Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press.
Bracher, Mark. (1995) Doctor-assisted suicide: Psychoanalysis of mass
anxiety. Psychoanalytic Review 82(5): 655-668.
Studies in Symbolic Interaction, (2008): pg. 197-226. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.

31

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Bromley, Roger. (2000) Narratives for a new belonging: Diasporic cultural
fictions. Edinburgh University Press.
Brownley, M.W. and Kimmich, A.B. (eds.) (1999) Women and Autobiography.
Wilmington, DE: SR Books.
Buber, Martin. [1923] (1958) I and Thou. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith.
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Buss, Helen M. (2002) Repossessing the World: Reading memoirs by
contemporary Women. Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press.
Cahill, Spencer E. (1998) Toward a sociology of the person. Sociological
Theory 16(2): 131-148.
Chodorow, Nancy. (1978) The Reproduction of Mothering : Psychoanalysis
and the Sociology of Gender. University of California Press.
Clement, Catherine. (1983) The Lives and Legends of Jacques Lacan.
Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. NY: Columbia University Press.
Cooley, CH. (1962) Social Organization. NY: Schocken Books.
DeBeauvoir, S. (1971) Second Sex. NY: Knopf.
DuBois, W.E.B. [1903] (1979) The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches
by W.E. Burghardt Du Bois. NY: Dodd, Mead & Company.
Eagleton, Terry. (1983) Literary Theory: An Introduction. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Eakin, Paul John. (2004) What are we reading when we read autobiography?
Narrative 12(2): 121-131.
Eakin, Paul John. (1990) How Our Lives Become Stories: making selves.
Cornell University Press.
Egan, Susanna. (undated). The Life and Times of Autothanatography. An
online discussion paper @
http://www.english.ubc.ca/PROJECTS/PAIN/DEGAN.HTM
Fand, Roxanne J. (1999) The dialogic self: Reconstructing subjectivity in
Woolf, Lessing, and Atwood. Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University
Press.
Forrester, John. (1997) Truth Games: Lies, money and psychoanalysis.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U Press.
Forte, James A. (2004) Symbolic interactionism and social work: A forgotten
legacy, Part 1. Families in Society: The journal of contemporary social
services 85(3): 391-400.
Gager, C.T. (1998) The role of valued outcomes, justifications, and
comparison referents in perceptions of fairness among dual-earner
couples. Journal of Family Issues 19: 622-648.
Gaines, E. (2005) Interpreting India: Identity and Media from the Field:
Exploring the Communicative Nature of the Exotic Other. Qualitative
Inquiry 11(4): 518-534.
Gergen, Kenneth. (1991) The saturated self: Dilemmas of identity in
contemporary life. NY: Basic Books.
Studies in Symbolic Interaction, (2008): pg. 197-226. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.

32

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Glowinski, H., Marks, Z.M., and Murphy, S. (eds.) (2001) A compendium of
Lacanian terms. NY: Free Association Books.
Goffman, Erving. (1971) Relations in public: Microstudies of the public order.
NY: Basic.
Goffman, Erving. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden
City, NY: Anchor Books.
Goffman, Erving. [1956] (1967) The Nature of Deference and Demeanor. Pp.
47-95 in Interaction Ritual. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Hage, Ghassan. (2005) White self-racialization as identity fetishism;
capitalism and the experience of colonial whiteness. Pp. 185-206 in
Murji, K and Solomos, J. (eds.) Racialization: Studies in theory and
practice. NY: Oxford University Press
Harre, Rom and Fathali Moghaddam (eds). (2003) The Self and Others:
Positioning individuals and groups in personal, political, and cultural
contexts. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Himsel, Amy J. and Wendy A. Goldberg. (2003) Social comparisons and
satisfaction with the division of housework: Implications for Men’s and
Women’s role strain. Journal of Family Issues 24(7): 843-866.
Hochschild, Arlie. (1983) The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of
Human Feeling, Berkeley: The University of California Press.
Hollway, Wendy. (1993) Heterosexual sex: Power and desire for the Other.
Pp. 195-203 in Fox, B.J. (ed). Family patterns, gender relations.
Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Holquist, Michael. (1999) From Dialogism: Bakhtin and his world. Pp. 95-107
in Emerson, C. (ed.) Critical essays on Mikhail Bakhtin. NY: G.K. Hall &
Co.
Holstein, James A. & Gubrium, Jaber F. (2000). The Self We Live By:
Narrative Identity in a Postmodern World. NY: Oxford University Press.
Hunsaker, S.V. (1999) Autobiography and national identity in the Americas.
Charolottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia.
Hurvitz , N. (1979) The significant other in marital and family therapy. Journal
of Sociology and Social Welfare 6: 122-143.
Irvine, L. (2004) A Model of Animal Selfhood: Expanding Interactionist
Possibilities. Symbolic Interaction 27(1): 3-21.
James, W. (1890 [1950]). The Principles of Psychology. New York: Dover.
Jenkins, Richard. (2000) Categorization: Identity, Social Process and
Epistemology. Current Sociology 48(3): 7-25.
Joas, Hans. (1998) The Autonomy of the self: The Meadian Heritage and its
postmodern challenge. European Journal of Social Theory 1(1): 7-18.
Kearney, R. (2004) Debates in continental philosophy: Conversations with
contemporary thinkers. NY: Fordham University Press.
Knadler, Stephen P. (2002) The Fugitive Race: Minority Writers Resisting
Whiteness Jackson. University Press of Mississippi.
Studies in Symbolic Interaction, (2008): pg. 197-226. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.

33

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Lacan, J. (1977) Ecrits: A selection. A. Sheridan, trans. NY: Norton.
Lemaire, A. (1977) Jacques Lacan. Trans. By David Macey. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul.
Lentin, Ronit. (2004) Strangers and strollers: Feminist notes on researching
migrant m/others. Women’s Studies International Forum 27: 301-314.
Linde, Charlotte. (1993) Life Stories: The creation of coherence. NY: Oxford U
press.
McAdams, D. P. (2006) The redemptive self: Stories Americans live by. NY:
Oxford University Press.
McAdams, Dan P. (1993) The stories we live by: Personal myths and the
making of the self. NY: Wm Morrow & Co.
Mead, G.H. [1934]. Mind, Self and Society. Edited by Charles Morris. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. Reprinted in Anselm Strauss (ed.) (1964)
G. H. Mead On Social Psychology: Selected Papers. University of
Chicago Press.
Melucci, Alberto. (1996) The playing self: Person and meaning in the
planetary society. NY: Cambridge University Press.
Michael, Eric. Unbecoming. (1997) Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Middlebrook, Christina. (1996) Seeing the Crab: A Memoir of Dying. N.Y.:
BasicBooks.
Miller, Melvin E. (1996) Ethics and Understanding through interrelationship: I
and Thou in Dialogue. Pp. 129-147 in Josselson, R. (ed.) Ethics and
process in the narrative study of lives Vol 4. Sage.
Miller, N.K. (1996) Bequest and betrayal: Memoirs of a parent’s death. NY:
Oxford University Press.
Miller, Nancy K. (1994) Representing Others: Gender and the Subjects of
Autobiography. differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 6.1:
1-27.
Morrison, Toni. Quoted in Elena Stone. (2002) Rising from Deep Places:
Women’s Lives and the ecology of voice and silence. NY: Peter Lang.
Nayak, Anoop. (2005) White lives. Pp. 141-162 in Murji, K. and Solomos, J.
(eds.) Racialization: Studies in theory and practice. NY: Oxford
University Press.
Nelson, Hilde Lindemann. (2001) Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Ogle, Jennifer Paff and Mary Lynn Damhorst. (2003) Mothers and daughters:
Interpersonal approaches to body and dieting. Journal of Family Issues
24(4): 448-487.
Ortega y Gassett, J. (1956). The dehumanization of art and other essays.
New York: Anchor.
Park, Lisa Sun-Hee. (2005) Consuming Citizenship: Children of Asian
immigrant entrepreneurs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Studies in Symbolic Interaction, (2008): pg. 197-226. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.

34

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Perinbanayagam, R.S. (1985) Signifiying Acts: Structure and Meaning in
Everyday Life. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press.
Perinbanayagam, R.S. (2000) The Presence of Self. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers.
Personal Narratives Group, (eds.). (1989) Interpreting Women’s Lives:
Feminist theory and personal narratives. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
Peters, Gerald. (1993) The Mutilating God: Authorship and authority in the
narrative of conversion. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
Punday, D. (2003) Narrative after deconstruction. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Randall, William Lowell. (1995) The stories we are: An essay on self-creation.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Rayson, A. (1999) Beneath the mask: Autobiographies of Japanese-American
women. Pp. 131-147 in Brownley, M.W. and Kimmich, A.B. (eds.)
1999. Women and Autobiography. Wilmington, DE: SR Books.
Root, M.P.P. (1999) Resolving “Other” Status: Identity Development of
Biracial Individuals. Pp. 539-454 in Stephanie Coontz (ed.) American
Families: A Multicultural Reader. London: Routledge.
Rosaldo, R. (1989). Culture and truth: The remaking of social analysis.
Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Rubenstein, Roberta. (1987) Boundaries of the Self: Gender, Culture, Fiction.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Sacks, O. (1985) The Man who mistook his wife for a hat and other clinical
tales. NY: Summit Books.
Sanders, C.R. and Arluke, A. (1993) If Lions Could Speak: Investigating the
Animal-Human Relationship and the Perspectives of Nonhuman Others.
Sociological Quarterly 34(3): 377-390.
Sawrey, Jessica. (2005) Wouldn’t it be nice: Performing the mediated self.
Qualitative Inquiry 11(5): 789-807.
Schutz, A. (1970) On Phenomenology and Social Relations. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Scott, Susie. (2004) The Shell, the Stranger and the Competent Other:
Towards a Sociology of Shyness. Sociology 38(1): 121-137.
Sennett, Richard and Jonathan Cobb. (1972) The Hidden Injuries of Class.
NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
Shon, Phillip Chong Ho. (2002) The Role of the Other in Mass Murder. JPCS:
Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture & Society 7(1): 54-60.
Siegel, Kristi.(1999) Women’s autobiographies, culture, feminism. NY: Peter
Lang.
Smiley, Jane. (1991) A thousand acres. NY: Knopf.
Socor, B.J. (1997) Conceiving the self: Presence and absence in
psychoanalytic theory. Madison, CT: International Universities Press.

Studies in Symbolic Interaction, (2008): pg. 197-226. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.

35

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Sparkes, Andrew C., Joanne Batey, and David Brown. (2005) The Muscled
Self and its aftermath: A life history study of an elite, black, male
bodybuilder. Auto/Biography 13: 131-160.
Steinbeck, John. [1937] (1946) Of Mice and Men. Pp. 227-323 in The Portable
Steinbeck. Selected by Pascal Covici. NY: The Viking Press.
Stone, Brendan. (2006) Diaries, self-talk, and psychosis: writing as a place to
live. Auto/Biography 14: 41-58.
Stone, Brendan. (2004) Towards a Writing without power: Notes on the
narration of madness. Auto/Biography 12: 16-33.
Stone, E. (2002) Rising from deep places: Women’s lives and the ecology of
voice and silence. NY: Peter Lang.
Stone, E. (1988) Black sheep and kissing cousins: How our family stories
shape us. NY: Times Books.
Wasson, K. (1994) Geography of conversion: Dialogical boundaries of self in
Antin’s Promised Land. Pp. 167-187 in Ashley, K., Gilmore, L., and
Peters, G. (eds.) Autobiography and postmodernism. Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press.
Wiener, Wendy J. & George C. Rosenwald. (1993) A Moment’s monument:
The psychology of keeping a diary. Pp. 30-58 in Ruthellen Josselson &
Amia Lieblish, eds. 1993. The Narrative Study of Lives. Vol.1 Sage.
Zaborowska, Magdalena J. (1995) How we found American: Reading gender
through East European immigrant narratives. Chapel Hill: U of NC
Press.

Studies in Symbolic Interaction, (2008): pg. 197-226. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.

36

